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Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum key distribution
system
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Phase randomization is a very important assumption in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key
distribution (QKD) system with a weak coherent source. Thus an active phase modulator is needed
to randomize the phase of source. However, it is hard to check whether the phase of source is
randomized totally or not in practical QKD systems. In this paper a partially random phase attack
is proposed to exploit this imperfection. Our analysis shows that Eve can break the security of a
two-way QKD system by using our attack, even if an active phase randomization is adopted by
Alice. Furthermore, the numerical simulation shows that in some parameter regimes, our attack is
immune to the one-deco-state method.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] admits two re-
mote parties, known as Alice and Bob, to establish an
unconditional secret key; even the eavesdropper (Eve)
has unlimited power admitted by the quantum mechan-
ics. The unconditional security of QKD has been proved
in theory for both the ideal system [2, 3] and the practi-
cal system [4, 5] based on some assumptions. However,
the practical QKD system is imperfect. Strictly speak-
ing, any deviation between the standard security analysis
and the practical QKD system can be exploited by Eve
to attack the practical system [6–12]. Therefore, in order
to guarantee the unconditional security of the final key
generated by the practical system, the legitimate par-
ties must survey the practical QKD system carefully and
close these loopholes.
In the standard security analysis for the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD system with a weak coher-
ent source (WCS), an important assumption is that the
phase of source has been randomized totally. Thus, in
the view of Eve, the state sent by Alice is a mixed state
of all number states. However, in a practical QKD sys-
tem, the phase information of source might be accessible
to Eve [13]. In order to remove the phase randomization
assumption from the standard security analysis, Lo and
Preskill have proved the security of BB84 protocol using
the WCS with nonrandom phase. But their proof is at
the price of the secret key rate and the maximal secu-
rity distance is very short [13]. Thus the best choice for
the legitimate parties is to actively randomize the WCS
phase, which can be implemented by modulating a to-
tally random phase θ ∈ [0, 2pi] with a phase modulator
[14]. In fact, in most practical QKD systems [15–18],
including the commercial system produced by Id Quan-
tique [15], the legitimate parties assume the phase of
source has been randomized totally, and thus they use the
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Gottensman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) formula [4]
but not the results of Ref.[13] to estimate the key rate.
Specifically, the phase randomization assumption is the
base of the decoy state method [19–22], which is often
used to defeat the photon number splitting (PNS) at-
tack [23, 24]. Thus, in the QKD system with decoy-state
method, only the GLLP formula can be used.
However, in practical situations, it is a hard task for
the legitimate parties to check whether the phase of
source has been randomized totally or not [25]. In the
latter, we will show that even if an active phase modulator
is used by the legitimate parties to randomize the phase
of source, Eve can change the range of random phase by
using the imperfection of the phase modulator so that
it is just partially randomized. Here partially random
means that the range of random phase modulated by Al-
ice is smaller than 2pi. In other words, the random phase
θ ∈ [0, δ] and δ < 2pi. Furthermore, we note that in most
of the practical system [15–18], no active setup is used
to randomize the phase of source. We think there may
be two reasons: (1) When Alice actively randomizes the
source, an additional active setup is needed which will
increase the complexity of the QKD system. (2) More
importantly, within the best of our knowledge, until now
there is not an effective attack strategy to exploit the
phase information of WCS. In other words, Eve does not
know how to spy the secret key, even if the source is not
randomized or just partially randomized.
In this paper, we propose a partially random phase
(PRP) attack to break the security of the practical two-
way QKD system using WCS. Then a simple intercept-
and-resend attack strategy and experimental arrange-
ment within current technology are proposed to spy the
secret key. Our analysis shows that the error rate induced
by Eve can be lower than the tolerable threshold value of
error rate, whereas the same range of error rate has been
proved secure if the legitimate parties are unaware of
our attack. Thus when our attack is taken into account,
the secret key rate will be compromised. Specifically,
the numerical simulations show that, in some parame-
ter regime, our attack is immune to the one-decoy-state
method [19–22] which is often used to defeat the PNS
2attack [23, 24]. Therefore, the legitimate parties should
consider our attack carefully when they use the WCS to
implement the BB84 protocol. However, note that we
only claim that our attack is immune to the one-decoy-
state method in some parameter regimes, but we do not
claim that our attack is completely immune to the decoy-
state-method. In fact, our attack can be defeated by the
two-decoy-state (weak + vacuum) method [21, 22], since
the vacuum state is used to estimate the gain and error
rate of the background.
We note that in Ref.[13], Lo and Preskill have pro-
posed a simple attack to exploit the nonrandom phase of
source. However, our attack performs better than their
attack at least in two aspects. First, in their attack Eve
performs the positive operator valued measure (POVM)
belonging to the photon number state space to distin-
guish the key bit, which can not be implemented within
current technology. Our attack needs only a homodyne
detector, which can be implemented within current tech-
nology. Second, in their attack Eve needs to know the
exact phase of source, which corresponds to the case that
the source is not randomized. But our attack is valid as
long as the source is partially randomized. Therefore, the
legitimate parties do not need to consider their attack,
especially in practical situations, but they must consider
our attack and monitor their system carefully.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II we in-
troduce how to exploit the imperfection of a partially
random phase to break the security of the cryptosystem.
In Sec. III we introduce an intercept-and-resend attack
with our PRP attack and then analyze the error rate in-
duced by our attack. In Sec. IV we show that our attack
is immune to the one-decoy-state method which can be
used to defeat the PNS attack. In Sec. V we provide
some discussion regarding our attack. Finally, in Sec. VI
we give a brief summary of this paper.
II. PRP ATTACK
In this section, we first introduce the plug-and-play
QKD system briefly. Then we discuss how to exploit
the partially random phase of source to spy the secret
key.
A. Plug-and-Play System
A simple diagram of a plug-and-play QKD system [26]
without Eve is shown in Fig.1(a). A strong pulse sent
by Bob’s laser will be divided into two parties by a 50:50
beam splitter (BS), noted as a signal pulse (s) and ref-
erence pulse (r). When the two pulses arrive at Alice’s
zone, Alice encodes her information on the signal pulse
by modulating a phase φak = kpi/2, k = 0, 1, 2, 3. In order
to ensure the global phase of pulse is totally random, Al-
ice modulates a random phase θ ∈ [0, δ] on both s and r.
Note that θ should be random on each pulse of the laser,
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FIG. 1: (Color online) A simple diagram of the Plug-and-Play
QKD system [26] and Eve’s experimental arrangement. LD:
laser diode; Cir: circulator; BS: 50/50 beam splitter; PBS: po-
larization beam splitter; Att.: attenuator; PM: phase modu-
lator; PR: phase randomizer; FM: Faraday mirror; QC: quan-
tum channel; D1 and D2: single photon detectors (SPDs); Dc
and Dd: photodiode. Note that in the commercial system
of Id Quantique, there is not PR [15]. Part (a) shows the
practical QKD system. Part (b) shows Eve’s experimental
arrangement. Eve intercepts the pulse from Bob and sends a
faked pulse to Alice. When the faked pulse is modulated by
Alice and returns to Eve, Eve measures it and modulates a
phase on Bob’s pulse according to her measurement results.
Then she resends Bob’s pulse to Bob. Note that in our at-
tack Eve uses the homodyne detection but not SPD to detect
Alice’s information.
but it must be the same for both s and r of each pulse.
Then the two pulses will be attenuated to a single photon
level and sent back to Bob. Thus the two outgoing pulses
from Alice’s zone can be written as
|αei(θ+θ′)〉r|αei(φ
a
k
+θ+θ′)〉s, (1)
where θ′ is the phase induced by the birefringence of fiber.
α is real and |α|2 is the average photon number of s and
r. Here we assume the Faraday mirror (FM) is perfect in
the QKD system; thus the birefringence of fiber can be
compensated successfully with a global phase θ′. Other-
wise Eve can obtain more information by combining with
the passive FM attack proposed by our group [12]. Note
that θ′ is a fixed value and can be compensated by Eve,
and thus we assume θ′ = 0 in this paper. Therefore the
practical state sent by Alice is given by
ρ =
∫ δ
0
dθ
δ
|αei(φak+θ)〉〈αei(φak+θ)|, (2)
where δ is range of random phase modulated by Alice.
Here we assume θ follows the uniform distribution on
[0, δ]. For the three cases that the phase is nonran-
domized, partially randomized, and totally randomized,
3δ = 0, 0 < δ < 2pi, and δ = 2pi, respectively. Note that in
Eq.(2) we consider only the signal pulse and ignore the
reference pulse, since only the signal pulse is modulated
by Alice.
Here we remark that if Alice does not actively random-
ize the phase of source or she thinks that Eve may know
the phase of source exactly, she must use the method
given by Ref. [13] to estimate the key rate. However,
the security analysis of Ref. [13] can only be used for
short-distance quantum cryptography. Thus, generally
speaking, Alice should use an active setup to randomize
the phase of source in the long-distance quantum cryp-
tography. However, in the practical QKD system, it is
a hard task for the legitimate parties to check whether
the phase is really totally randomized or not. In fact,
if Alice and Bob do not check carefully that the phase
is truly random, then the range of random phase can
be controlled by Eve so that it is just partially random-
ized (δ < 2pi). For example, in the two-way QKD system,
since the phase modulator has a finite response time, Eve
can control the practical phase modulated on the pulse
by shifting the arrival time of the signal pulse to the ris-
ing or falling edge of the phase modulator. It is known as
a phase remapping attack, which was proposed by Fung
et al. in theory [10] and then demonstrated by Xu et al.
in experiment [11]. Thus the practical phase modulated
on the source will be lower than the expected phase of
Alice, if Eve shifts the arrival time of the pulse. For in-
stance, Alice wants to modulate a random phase θ′, but
the practical phase modulated on the source is θ < θ′.
Therefore, in the practical QKD system, the range of ran-
dom phase modulated by Alice can be controlled by Eve
so that the pulse is just partially modulated (δ < 2pi).
B. PRP Imperfection
We have shown that the random phase can be con-
trolled by Eve so that it is just partially modulated. In
the following, we will show how Eve can exploit this im-
perfection to spy the secret key.
Since Alice admits the pulse into and out of her zone
in the two-way system, it is easy for Eve to set her exper-
imental arrangement to load our attack, which is shown
in Fig.1(b). The strong pulse sent by Eve’s laser will be
divided into three parts by two BS, signal pulse (s), ref-
erence pulse (r) and local pulse (l). Then Eve sends s
and r to Alice and keeps l in her own hand. When the
pulse is modulated by Alice and resent back to Eve, Eve
modulates randomly l with a phase φej = jpi/2, j = 0, 1.
Then s will interfere with l at BS and be detected by two
photodiodes (Dc and Dd).
Here Eve uses a homodyne detector to analyze
Alice’s information. The homodyne detection is a
well-established quantitative method to measure the
quadrature-amplitude operator of the signal field [27, 28]
or implement the continuous variable quantum cryptog-
raphy [29, 30]. A simple illustration of the homodyne
detection is shown in Fig.1(b). The signal pulse (s) and
the local pulse (l) interfere at a 50/50 beam splitter (BS).
Then the two output modes of BS, c and d, will reach
two photodiodes (Dc and Dd) respectively. The mea-
sured output signal of homodyne detection is determined
by the difference of Dc and Dd, which is given by [31]
i ∝ √nl〈ase−iφ
′
+ a+s e
iφ′〉 ≡ √2nlx, (3)
where nl is the average photon number of the local pulse,
as is the annihilation operator of signal pulse, φ
′ is the
difference of phase between signal pulse and local pulse.
Here we assume the local pulse is strong coherent state.
x is known as the normalized quadrature amplitude of
the signal. Generally speaking, x takes a random value
for each pulse due to the quantum fluctuations. Theo-
retically, the probability of x is given by integrating the
Wigner distribution [32], which is given by
P (x, θ′) =
∫
∞
−∞
W (x cos θ′ − p sin θ′, x sin θ′ + p cos θ′)dp,
(4)
where W (q, p) is the Wigner function in p− q space.
It is easy to check that, when the signal pulse is co-
herent state, the probability distribution of x is given by
[31, 33]
P (x, φ, θ) =
√
2
piκ2
exp[−2(x− λ√µs cos(φ+ θ))2/κ2],
(5)
where µs = |α|2 is the average photon number of signal
pulse, φ = φak−φej is the difference of phase modulated by
Eve and Alice, θ ∈ [0, δ] is the random phase modulated
by Alice. λ and κ are two parameters that characterize
the imperfection of homodyne detection [31, 34]. When
the homodyne is perfect, λ = κ = 1. According to Eq.2,
Eve has no priori information about θ excepting that
θ ∈ [0, δ], thus Eq.(5) should be rewritten as
P (x, φ) =
∫ δ
0
dθ
δ
√
2
piκ2
exp[−2(x−λ√µs cos(φ+θ))2/κ2].
(6)
Fig.2 shows the theoretical probability distribution of
x when the total phase shifts φ are 0, pi/2, pi and 3pi/2.
It shows clearly that measured result of the homodyne
detection can be used to distinguish 0 and pi by setting
a suitable threshold value. For example, Eve can set
two threshold value X+ ≥ 0 and X− ≤ 0. When the
measured quadrature amplitude x ≥ X+, Eve judge that
φ = 0; when x ≤ X−, Eve judge that φ = pi. But when
X− < x < X+, Eve can’t give a judgement about the
phase. Although Eve can’t distinguish the four phases
deterministically, it is easy to check that, the conditional
probability that Eve obtain a valid outcome given that
φ = 0 or φ = pi can be much larger than that of φ =
pi/2 and φ = 3pi/2. Here, a valid outcome means the
measured outcome x satisfies x ≥ X+ or x ≤ X−.
Obviously, the smaller the probability Eve makes a
wrong judgement, the larger µs is. Here wrong judge-
ment means Eve obtains X+ (or X−) but the state sent
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The theoretical probability distribution
of the quadrature amplitude when the total phase shifts are
0, pi/2, pi and 3pi/2. In the figure, we show the three case
that the source has been unrandomized (δ = 0), partially
randomized (δ = pi/4) and totally randomized (δ = 2pi). Here
we set λ = 0.75 and κ = 1.1 due to the experimental results
of Ref.[31]. X+ and X− are two threshold values used to
distinguish 0 and pi from the set {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}.
by Alice isn’t φ = 0 (or φ = pi). In order to maximize
Eve’s information for a given system, we make two re-
marks about the optimal intensity of signal pulse (µs)
that is accessible for Eve.
Remark one: Generally speaking, Alice will monitor
the power of light coming into her zone, thus Eve should
set the intensity of light sent to Alice carefully. However,
note the fact that, Alice doesn’t monitor the intensity
of s and r respectively in most practical QKD systems.
Thus Eve only needs to ensure the total of them entering
Alice’s zone, denoted as nia, is unchanged, but no needs
to keep the intensities of both s and r to be the same
as their expected values respectively. In other words,
Eve can change the proportion of average photon number
between signal pulse and reference pulse (denoted as ns
and nr respectively), but keeps ns+nr = n
i
a constant. In
the following, we let ns = βn
i
a and nr = (1− β)nia. Note
that, if Alice monitors the intensity of signal pulse and
reference pulse at the same time, Eve can’t change the
proportion between ns and nr. Then Eve must keep the
intensity of ns and nr unchanged, which means β = 1/2.
Remark two: Note that only s will be modulated by
Alice, thus Eve should increase the coefficient β to max-
imize her information. The maximal value of β that can
be set by Eve, denoted as βmax, depends on the way
that Alice and Bob synchronize their clock in the practi-
cal QKD system. Generally speaking, there are two ways
to synchronize the clock of Alice and Bob. One way is
that Alice triggers her setups according to the arrival
time of r. Thus (1− βmax)nia is the minimal intensity of
r that can trigger Alice’s setups, which depends on the
efficiency of Alice’s photodiode. The other way is that
Alice synchronizes her clock with Bob according to an-
other optical or electric signal, such as the wavelength di-
vision multiplexing [35]. In this case, Alice doesn’t know
whether r arrives at her zone or not. Thus, Eve can
block the reference pulse and only send s to Alice, which
means βmax = 1. In this paper we assume that Alice
and Bob use the second way to synchronize their clock,
thus ns = n
i
a. Therefore, the intensity of signal pulse
outgoing Alice’s zone is µs = γns = γn
i
a, where γ is the
transmittance of Alice’s attenuator.
III. INTERCEPT-AND-RESEND ATTACK
WITH PRP
We show that the partially random phase of source
may leave a loophole for Eve to spy the secret key. Gen-
erally speaking, when an imperfection is found by Eve,
she can combine all imperfections of the system and take
advantage of all attack strategies to maximize her infor-
mation of the key. However we only consider a simple
intercept-and-resend attack in this paper, which clearly
shows that the generated key will be compromised due
to the partially random phase.
According to the analysis above, we can consider the
following attack: Eve intercepts all the pulse from Alice
and measures the quadrature amplitude (x) of the signal
pulse with the experimental arrangement of Fig.1(b). In
order to judge Alice’s phase information, Eve modulates
the local pulse randomly and equiprobably with one of
the two phases φej = jpi/2, j = 0, 1. Then she sets two
threshold value X+ and X−. Simply, we consider the
symmetrical case that X+ = −X− ≡ Xth in this paper.
When x ≥ Xth, Eve judges that the phase modulated by
Alice is the same as her, thus she resends a state with
phase φej to Bob. When x ≤ −Xth, Eve judges that the
difference of phase modulated by Alice and her is pi, thus
she resends a state with phase φej + pi to Bob. When
−Xth ≤ x ≤ Xth, she blocks this pulse and resends a
vacuum state to Bob. Note that these invalid judgements
will not affect our attack, since the channel between Alice
and Bob is lossy.
Obviously, sometimes, Eve may make a wrong judge-
ment. However, it is easy to check that, when Eve uses
the same basis as Alice, the probability that Eve obtains
a valid outcome is much higher than that Eve uses the
different basis with Alice. Here a valid outcome means
that the measured outcome x of Eve satisfies x ≥ Xth
or x ≤ −Xth. Generally speaking, the larger Eve sets
Xth, the lower the error rate. But, at the same time,
the probability that Eve obtains a valid outcome will de-
crease. Thus Eve should make a tradeoff between the
error rate and efficiency when she loads her attack in a
practical situation.
In order not to be discovered, Eve should ensure that
5the error rate induced by her attack is smaller than the
tolerable threshold value of Alice and Bob. In the follow-
ing, we analyze the error rate induced by Eve’s attack
and show that Eve can load our attack without being
discovered by the legitimate parties. Without loss of gen-
eralization, we assume that the phase modulated by Alice
is φa0 = 0. According to Eq.(6), when Eve modulates the
local pulse with a phase φe0 = 0, the probability that she
obtains a valid outcome are given by
P+0 =
√
2
piδ2κ2
∫
∞
Xth
dx
∫ δ
0
dθ exp[−2(x−√µs cos(θ))2/κ2],
(7a)
P−0 =
√
2
piδ2κ2
∫
−Xth
−∞
dx
∫ δ
0
dθ exp[−2(x−√µs cos(θ))2/κ2].
(7b)
Obviously, when Eve obtains x ≥ Xth, she will not induce
any error. But when Eve obtains x ≤ −Xth, she will
induce an error event with a probability up to 1. At
the same time, Eve may modulate the local pulse with a
phase φe1 = pi/2, then the probability that she obtains a
valid outcome are given by
P+pi/2 =
√
2
piδ2κ2
∫
∞
Xth
dx
∫ δ
0
dθ exp[−2(x+√µs sin(θ))2/κ2],
(8a)
P−pi/2 =
√
2
piδ2κ2
∫
−Xth
−∞
dx
∫ δ
0
dθ exp[−2(x+√µs sin(θ))2/κ2].
(8b)
Obviously, she will induce an error event with a probabil-
ity 1/2 for this case, no matter which outcome is obtained
by her. Therefore, the error rate induced by Eve can be
written as
e =
P−0 + [P
+
pi/2 + P
−
pi/2]/2
P+0 + P
−
0 + P
+
pi/2 + P
−
pi/2
. (9)
Here we assume Eve modulates randomly 0 or pi/2 with
equal probability. Since the four states sent by Alice are
symmetrical, the total error rate induced by Eve’s attack
is the same as Eq.(9). At the same time, the probability
that Eve obtains a valid outcome is given by:
Ppost = (P
+
0 + P
−
0 + P
+
pi/2 + P
−
pi/2)/2. (10)
The error rate induced by our attack is shown in Fig.3.
It shows clearly that when the phase of source is just par-
tially random, the generated key will be compromised.
In part(a) we show that the error rate changes with Xth
and δ. As expected, for given δ, the higher the thresh-
old value Xth is set by Eve, the lower the error rate will
be. For example, when δ = pi/6 and µs = 0.3, the error
rate is 9.21% and 13.79% for Xth = 2 and Xth = 1.5
respectively. At the same time, the smaller the range
of partially random phase δ is, the lower the error rate
will be. For example, when Eve sets Xth = 2, the error
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The error rate induced by Eve. In
the simulations, we set λ = 0.75 and κ = 1.1 due to the
experimental results of Ref.[31]. Part(a) shows the error rate
changes with Xth and δ for given µs = 0.3. Part(b) shows the
error rate changes with Xth and µs for given δ = pi/6. In the
figure, we also draw the contour line for e = 11%, 15%, 20%.
rate is 8.01%, 9.21% and 12.65% for δ = pi/8, δ = pi/6
and δ = pi/4 respectively. According to Eq.6, the error
rate induced by Eve will depend on the intensity of signal
pulse µs, which is shown in Fig.3 (part(b)). For example,
when Eve sets Xth = 2 and δ = pi/6, the error rate will
be 6.06%, 9.21% and 18.65% for µs = 0.5, 0.3, 0.1 respec-
tively. In other words, if Eve wants to keep the error rate
is smaller than 20%, she only needs to set Xth = 1.02 for
µs = 0.3, but Xth will increase to 1.86 for µs = 0.1
According to the analysis above, we know that Eve
can reduce the error rate induced by her attack by in-
creasing the threshold value Xth. However, the higher
Xth is, the lower Eve obtains an unambiguous result
that x ≥ Xth or x ≤ −Xth. Although Eve can send
vacuum state to Bob when she obtains the ambigu-
ous result that −Xth < x < Xth, she should ensure
that the expected count rate of Bob is unchanged. In
other words, Eve should ensure that the equation that
PpostηBobµE = µsηcηBob holds. Here ηBob is the trans-
mittance of Bob’s setups. ηc = 10
−al/10 is the trans-
mittance of channel. µE is the intensity of pulse sent
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FIG. 4: (Color online)The equivalent length of channel that
Eve can load her attack successfully for a given Xth. Here
we assume the channel is fiber and µs = 0.3, In the simula-
tions, we set ηBob = 0.045, λ = 0.75 and κ = 1.1 due to the
experimental result of [18, 31]. Part(a) shows the equivalent
distance when Eve sends a single photon state to Bob, which
means µE = 1 and the detection efficiency of Bob ηBob is
not compensated. Part(b) shows the case that µE = 1/ηBob,
which means that Eve compensates totally Bob’s detection
efficiency ηBob by sending a strong pulse to Bob.
to Bob by Eve. Here we assume that Eve can send a
strong pulse to Bob to compensate ηBob, which means
µE = 1/ηBob. Therefore, the maximal value of Xth is de-
termined by the transmittance of channel between Alice
and Bob. The equivalent length of channel for a given
Xth is given by
l = −10
a
log10[min{1, µEPpost/µs}], (11)
where we assume the channel is fiber and a = 0.21dB/km
is the typical loss of fiber and Ppost is given by Eq.10.
Fig.4 shows the equivalent length of channel changes
with Xth and δ. It shows clearly that our attack is valid
even the channel distance of Alice and Bob is very short.
It can be explained as the maximal Xth that Eve can set
for a given length of channel. Note that the error rate
induced by Eve is determined by Xth. Thus it also can
be explained as the minimal error rate induced by our
attack for a given length of channel. For example, if the
length of channel between Alice and Bob is 50 km, the
maximal Xth that Eve can set is 1.97 when δ = pi/6 and
µs = 0.3, thus the minimal error rate induced by Eve is
9.36%.
IV. ONE DECOY STATE METHOD
It is well known that, in the practical QKD systems
with the WCS, the decoy state method should be used
to beat the PNS attack. In this section, we will show
that, if Alice and Bob use the one decoy state method to
estimate the final secret key rate, Eve still can spy the
secret key using our attack in some parameter regime.
Although the one decoy state is not optimal for Alice
and Bob, it is still adopted in some experimental systems
[17, 36].
In the one decoy state method, Alice will send two
kinds of pulses with different intensities to Bob, the signal
state and the decoy state, whose average photon number
are denoted as µ and ν (µ > ν > 0) respectively. Then
they estimate the lower bound for the yield of single pho-
ton state, Y L1 , and the upper bound for error rate of sin-
gle photon state, eU1 , which are given by the Eq.(41) of
Ref.[22]:
Y L1 =
µ
µν − ν2 [Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
], (12a)
eU1 =
EνQνe
ν
Y L1 ν
, (12b)
where Qµ and Qν are the gain of the signal state and
the decoy state, Eµ is the error rate of the decoy state,
e0 = 1/2 is the error rate of background. Note that Alice
and Bob will think that the phase of source has been ran-
domized totally (in fact it is just partially randomized),
thus they will use the GLLP formula to estimate the key
rate, which is given by [4]:
R ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +QL1 [1−H2(eU1 )]}, (13)
where q = 1/2 with the standard BB84 protocol.
f(e) = 1.22 is the bidirectional error correction efficiency.
H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary
Shannon information entropy. QL1 = µe
−µY L1 is the gain
of single photon state, Eµ is the error rate of the signal
state.
Note that, in the decoy state method, Eve can’t dis-
tinguish the signal state and the decoy state. Thus we
assume Eve sends a single photon state to Bob, when she
obtains a valid measurement outcome. Thus the gain and
error rate of Bob for the signal state and the decoy state
are given by
Qµ = ηBobQ
′
µ + (1− ηBob)Y0,
EµQµ = ηBobQ
′
µE
′
µ + (1− ηBob)Y0e0,
Qν = ηBobQ
′
ν + (1− ηBob)Y0,
EνQν = ηBobQ
′
νE
′
ν + (1− ηBob)Y0e0,
(14)
where Y0 is the dark count of Bob’s single photon detec-
tor, e0 = 0.5 is the error rate of dark count. Under our
attack, E′µ and E
′
ν are given by Eq.(9), Q
′
µ and Q
′
ν are
given by Eq.(10).
Substituting these parameters into Eq.(13), it is easy to
estimate the key rate under our attack, which is shown in
Fig.5. Here we also show the equivalent length of channel
between Alice and Bob, which is given by
Leq = −10
a
log10[min{1,
Qµ
µηBob
}], (15)
where Qµ is the gain of signal state. Here the equivalent
length is used to ensure the gain of signal state under our
attack is same as Bob’s expectancy.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The key rate between Alice and Bob at
various threshold value Xth. Here the legitimate parties use
the one decoy state method to estimate the key rate. Here we
set µ = 0.48 and ν = 0.05 according to the decoy state theory
[22] and the experimental parameters of GYS [18], which are
laser λ = 1550 nm at 2 MHz, dark count rate Y0 = 1.7×10−6,
fiber loss 0.21 dB/km, Bob’s quantum efficiency ηBob = 0.045.
In the simulation, we assume the homodyne detector of Eve
is perfect, which means λ = κ = 1. Strictly speaking, the
equivalent length will change with δ, but the difference is
much small. Thus we just draw the equivalent length for
δ = 17◦ in the figure.
The numerical simulations show clearly that, Eve can
ensure the key rate between Alice and Bob is still positive
by setting a suitable threshold value. For example, when
δ = 17◦, the key rate is positive if Eve sets Xth > 1.37,
but in fact no secret key can be generated in this range,
since Eve’s intercept-and-resend attack is an entangle-
ment breaking channel [10, 37]. Fig.5 also shows clearly
that our attack can be implemented successfully even the
distance of channel between Alice and Bob is short. For
example, if Eve sets Xth = 1.4, the key rate will be pos-
itive and the equivalent length of channel is about 50.83
km.
Note that, in the simulation of Fig.5, we assume the
homodyne detector of Eve is perfect. Although Eve can
make a perfect homodyne detector in theory, a practical
Eve is still imperfect. In Fig.6, we show the key rate
changes with the two parameters λ and κ which are used
to characterize the imperfections of Eve’s homodyne de-
tector. It shows clearly that our attack is still valid even
the homodyne detector of Eve is imperfect. In Fig.6, we
also draw the equivalent length of channel with the same
parameters as that of key rate. It shows clearly that even
the length of channel between Alice and Bob is short, our
attack is still valid.
In Fig.7, we also show the key rate changes with the in-
tensity of signal state and decoy state. Generally speak-
ing, for a given practical QKD system, the legitimate
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The key rate between Alice and Bob
changes with the parameters that characterize the imperfec-
tion of homodyne detection. In the simulation, we also use the
experimental parameters of GYS (see Fig.5) and set µ = 0.48
and ν = 0.05. Here we assume the partially randomized
phase is δ = 10◦ and Eve sets Xth = 1.4. The point that
λ = κ = 1 represents a perfect homodyne detector. In the
figure, we also draw the equivalent length of channel when
Eve sets Xth = 1.4.
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FIG. 7: (Color online)The key rate changes with the intensity
of signal state and decoy state. In the simulation, we assume
the homodyne detector is perfect and Eve sets Xth = 1.4.
Here the partially randomized is set as δ = 10◦. The equiva-
lent length is also drawn in the figure to show that our attack
is valid even in the short-distance QKD system.
parties will optimize the intensity of signal state and de-
coy state (µ and ν) to maximize the key rate. For ex-
ample, in the experimental parameters of Gobby-Yuan-
Shield (GYS), the optimal µ and ν are 0.48 and 0.036
when the length of channel between Alice and Bob is
50km. However, under these parameters, the final key
rate is still positive under our attack, but in fact no secret
key can be generated. In other words, when our attack
is taken into account, the estimated optimal parameters
that are unaware of our attack may be not secret. Thus,
in a practical system, the legitimate parties must set their
experimental parameters carefully.
Here we remark that, although our attack is immune
to the one decoy state method, it can be defeated by the
vacuum+weak decoy state method, in which Alice sends
three kinds of pulses to Bob, the signal state, the decoy
8state and the vacuum state. The main reason is that Eve
may obtain valid outcome with a high probability, even
Alice sends a vacuum state. Thus the gain of vacuum
state will be much larger than the dark count of single
photon detector (SPD), and then can be found by Alice
and Bob.
V. DISCUSSION
We have shown that our attack can be used by Eve to
break the security of a practical QKD system with WCS,
even the one decoy state method is used by Alice and
Bob. In the end of this paper, we give some discussions
about our attack.
First, it has shown that our attack can beat the BB84
QKD system with WCS and SPD. However, it is invalid
for the continuous variable QKD (CV-QKD) scheme. In
the CV-QKD, Bob also uses the homodyne detection to
measure the signal pulse, thus he can reconstruct the
probability distribution of signal pulse and then discover
the existence of Eve. Furthermore, due to the same
reason as the CV-QKD, our attack is also invalid for
the BB84 QKD system with pulse homodyne detection,
which is proposed and demonstrated by Hirano [31] et al.
Second, in this paper, we assume that Eve only changes
the random phase of source which is a global phase, but
not remaps the bit phase which is a relative phase. In
other words, in the analysis above, we assume the states
sent by Alice are still the standard BB84 states. Strictly
speaking, Eve also can change the bit phase. Then Eve
can combine our attack with the phase remapping attack
[10, 11] to maximize her information.
Third, in high-speed QKD system, Eve needs a high-
speed homodyne detector to detect the signal pulse. It
seems an experimental challenge to implement our at-
tack. In fact, the speed of some commercial homodyne
detectors produced by Picometrix can reach 40GHz [38].
Thus our attack is valid even for the high-speed QKD
system. Further, a well-stable interferometer is needed
to ensure that the local pulse and signal pulse can inter-
fere at the BS. Thus Eve must compensate the phase shift
of fiber induced by the environment. In fact, the feed-
back method developed in the GHz QKD system [16] can
also be used in our attack to ensure the interferometer of
Eve is very stable.
VI. SUMMARY
For the BB84 QKD protocol, phase randomization is
a very important assumption in the standard security
analysis. However, it is a hard task to check whether
the phase of source is randomized totally or not in the
practical situation. In fact, Eve can control the range of
random phase so that it is just partially randomized.
In this paper, we proposed a partially random phase
attack to spy the secret key. Our results show that if the
phase of source is partially randomized, the error rate
induced by our attack can be lower than the tolerable
threshold value of error rate whereas the same range of
error rate has been proved secure if the legitimate parties
are unaware of our attack. Thus the secret key generated
by a practical QKD system will be compromised. Spe-
cially, the numerical simulation shows that our attack
is immune to the one decoy state method in some pa-
rameter regime. Therefore, the legitimate parties should
consider our attack carefully, when they use the WCS to
implement the BB84 protocol.
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